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State-population monotonicity

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Entitlement-ratio, weight-ratio,[1] vote-ratio,[2]: Sub.9.6  or population-ratio monotonicity[3]: Sec.4  is a property of apportionment methods. It says that if the entitlement for A increases proportionally to that of B, then A should not lose any seats to B. Apportionments violating this rule are called population paradoxes; a particularly severe variant, where voting for a party (or moving into a state) causes it to lose seats, is called a no-show paradox.

Population-pair monotonicity

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Pairwise monotonicity says that if the ratio between the entitlements of two states increases, then state should not gain seats at the expense of state . In other words, a shrinking state should not "steal" a seat from a growing state. This property is also called vote-ratio monotonicity.

Weak monotonicity

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Voter monotonicity or participation criterion is a property weaker than pairwise-PM. It says that, if party i attracts more voters, while all other parties keep the same number of voters, then party i must not lose a seat. Failure of voter monotonicity is called the no-show paradox, since a voter can help their party by not voting. The largest remainders method fails voter monotonicity.[4]: Sub.9.14 

Maskin monotonicity

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A stronger variant of population monotonicity, calle requires that, if a state's entitlement (share of the population) increases, then its apportionment should not decrease, regardless of what happens to any other state's entitlement. This variant is extremely strong, however: whenever there are at least 3 states, and the house size is not exactly equal to the number of states, no apportionment method is strongly monotone for a fixed house size.[3]: Thm.4.1  Strong monotonicity failures in divisor methods happen when one state's entitlement increases, causing it to "steal" a seat from another state whose entitlement is unchanged.

However, it is worth noting that the traditional form of the divisor method, which involves using a fixed divisor and allowing the house size to vary, satisfies strong monotonicity in this sense.

References

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  1. ^ Chakraborty, Mithun; Schmidt-Kraepelin, Ulrike; Suksompong, Warut (2021-04-29). "Picking sequences and monotonicity in weighted fair division". Artificial Intelligence. 301: 103578. arXiv:2104.14347. doi:10.1016/j.artint.2021.103578. S2CID 233443832.
  2. ^ Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2017), Pukelsheim, Friedrich (ed.), "Securing System Consistency: Coherence and Paradoxes", Proportional Representation: Apportionment Methods and Their Applications, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 159–183, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-64707-4_9, ISBN 978-3-319-64707-4, retrieved 2021-09-02
  3. ^ a b Balinski, Michel L.; Young, H. Peyton (1982). Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote. New Haven: Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-02724-9.
  4. ^ Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2017), Pukelsheim, Friedrich (ed.), "Securing System Consistency: Coherence and Paradoxes", Proportional Representation: Apportionment Methods and Their Applications, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 159–183, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-64707-4_9, ISBN 978-3-319-64707-4, retrieved 2021-09-02